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Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Foticy, 1945-1965,1 by Ide Anak 
Agung Gde Agung, is an administrator's view of Indonesian foreign pol­
icy from, 1945 to 1965. In terms of his political-diplomatic career 
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung would seem well qualified to write such an 
account. Born in 1921 the son of the Rajah of Gianjar in Bali, Agung 
enjoyed the benefits not only of aristocratic breeding, but a Dutch 
university education in Batavia. By 1948, three years after Sukarno 
and Hatta had proclaimed the independence of Indonesia, Agung had risen 
to the important, but controversial position of Prime Minister of the 
State of East Indonesia--the largest of the several states created at 
Dutch instigation to ensure Dutch predominance within the projected 
federal government of the United States of Indonesia. Gradually bal­
ancing his Dutch ties with a more pro-Republic orientation, Agung 
played a significant role in the multilateral diplomacy that ended the 
fighting and won independence for Indonesia at the subsequent Round 
Table Conference in the fall of 1949.
Following service as Minister of Interior in the short-lived Hatta 
cabinet in 1950, Agung's Dutch sympathies won him assignment as Ambas­
sador to Belgium. By 1955 he had also had ambassadorial assignments in 
Luxembourg, Portugal and France. The latter post led in 1954 to his 
selection as Indonesian observer at the Geneva Conference. In the sum­
mer of 1955 Agung attained the pinnacle of his vocation with his in­
stallation as Foreign Minister in the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet.
Upon the resignation of that caretaker cabinet in early 1956, Agung 
became a senior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs. In­
creasingly relegated to the periphery of policy-making during the tran­
sition to Guided Democracy, Agung's deepening antagonism toward Sukar­
no's policies prompted his dismissal in 1961 and subsequent imprisom- 
ment without trial. Only with the accession of Suharto to power in 
1966 did Agung win release. After spending 1966-67 as a research 
fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii, Agung resumed his diplomatic 
career as an assistant to Foreign Minister Malik and, since 1970, as 
Ambassador to Austria.
Even this sketch of Agung's career establishes him as a notable 
member of that second generation of the Indonesian political elite that 
first came to prominence during the 1945 revolution. More specifically, 
Agung belonged to a small, but influential right-wing group of former 
federalists who had, in varying degrees, cooperated with the Dutch be­
fore and during the revolution. Following independence Agung naturally 
became associated with what he terms the "center-right" segment of the 
elite of the parliamentary period. Approvingly tagged "responsible 
moderates" by American diplomats--and "administrators" by the political 
scientist, Herb Feith--Agung's center-right grouping shared a generally
1. (The Hague: Mouton 5 Co., 1973).
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privileged background, legal-administrative political skills and a 
Western orientation. In foreign policy the "administrators" reconciled 
attachment to Indonesia's "active and independent" non-alignment with 
an unspoken, but pronounced Western bias. Tacitly looking to the Amer­
ican 7th fleet for military protection, they also invited economic de­
pendency on Western financial assistance and investment as the neces­
sary price for sustaining both economic development and their own 
political power.
Given Agung's political orientation, it is not surprising that he 
chose the prototype "administrator," former Vice-President Hatta, to 
write the introduction to his book. Equally predictable are the pur­
poses of this book. The first half of its nearly 600 pages seeks to 
demonstrate-how during the pre-Guided Democracy years Dutch and Ameri­
can intransigence on the West Irian issue undermined the best efforts 
of "administrator" cabinets to solve the issue and thus prevent the 
rise to power of Sukarno and his communist backers. A subordinate 
theme recounts how the arrogance of Indian leaders reinforced the radi­
calizing consequences of the festering Irian question. Wounded by the 
patronizing rebuff of Nehru and Menon to his bid for an Afro-Asian 
leadership role, Sukarno responded increasingly to the charm and skill 
of Chou En-lai's diplomacy first displayed at the April 1955 Bandung 
Conference.
The second half of the book concentrates on detailing Sukarno's 
betrayal of non-alignment principles for a radical nationalist confron­
tation foreign policy. Most conspicuous in the "crush Malaysia" policy 
and the attendant estrangement from the United States, Sukarno's em­
brace of confrontation concurrently meant, as Agung stresses, the ce­
menting of relations with both the PKI at home and Peking abroad.
Agung furnishes no integrating concluding chapter to his bloated chron­
icle of Sukarno's betrayal of non-alignment. In a brief epilogue, how­
ever, he approvingly reports that the army's New Order has restored 
Indonesian foreign policy to its traditional and proper principles of 
an "active and independent" non-alignment with, he might have added, 
the familiar Western bias of the "administrators" of the 1950s.
As reflected in the brief recital of the book's contents, Agung 
has attempted much more than the conventional personal memoir. Driven 
by his evident personal and ideological bitterness toward Sukarno--as 
well as, perhaps, by a sales-minded publisher-Agung has sought to pro­
duce a general interpretive history of Indonesian foreign policy from 
1945 to 1965. In order to lend credibility to his indictment of Sukar­
no, Agung is forced to devote half of his bulky 600-page chronicle to 
the Guided Democracy period. In prison through most of that period, 
Agung necessarily relies almost exclusively on Western secondary 
sources to patch together rather polemical, repetitive and even incon­
sistent chapters on subjects he knows largely second-hand. More seri­
ously, his personal outrage with American Ambassador Jones' "supine" 
diplomacy toward Sukarno leads him into an unbalanced, incomplete and 
sometimes inaccurate portrayal of both Jones' role and the objectives 
of Washington's policy. There is, for example, little appreciation of 
the crucial importance of the Indonesian army in the thinking of all 
American officials.
Happily, the first part of the book tends to correct some of the 
inadequacies of the second part. Here at least intermittently Agung 
relies on personal experience to offer not only a fresh Indonesian 
vantage point on controversial moments in Indonesian foreign relations,
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but also some insight into Agung's own attitudes and behavior. We find 
him, for example, straining to counter his federalist reputation by 
challenging Railin's picture of East Indonesia as just another Dutch 
puppet state. Later in discussing the foreign policies of the first 
Ali cabinet Agung registers his own pride in the Sukarno-Ali use of the 
Bandung Conference to enhance Indonesia's international prestige, even 
as he complains of their excessive concern with grandeur and domestic 
political advantage at the expense of warm relations with the West.
The most illuminating historical memoir in Agung's lengthy chron­
icle is the chapter on his seven-month tenure as Foreign Minister in 
1955-56. Drawing on some hitherto unpublished personal papers and 
recollections, Agung provides an informed and spirited defense of his 
handling, of the dominant foreign policy preoccupation of the Harahap 
cabinet--the arranging and conduct of what proved to be the last bi­
lateral Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on the already embittered dispute 
over West Irian. Held in Geneva during the winter of 1955, these talks 
constituted the final major effort of the "administrator" moderates to 
deprive Sukarno and his PNI and PKI allies of the inflammatory nation­
alist issue on which they could ride to political power. Stated more 
bluntly, and as Agung apparently understood at the time, failure to win 
concessions from The Hague at the Geneva talks would hasten the politi­
cal decline of both the Indonesian moderates and their ambivalent West­
ern allies.
Within days of his installation as Foreign Minister, Agung out­
lined his strategy for accomplishing this urgent preventive action. 
Closely paralleling the diplomatic strategy formulated by Hatta and 
Sjahrir during the revolution, Agung placed heavy reliance on convinc­
ing Holland's allies to persuade her to negotiate. While Agung's 
rapprochement efforts did soften the tone of Australian and American 
statements, he had no success in altering their basic position. In his 
personal meeting with Secretary Dulles, Agung encountered not only a 
familiar litany about Washington's neutrality, but a heated rejection 
of the suggestion that such neutrality worked to Dutch advantage. The 
only responsive Western capital was London. Reminiscent of the role 
thrust upon them in 1945-46, the British agreed to recommend to the 
Dutch to accept the Indonesian offer to negotiate.
Nicely illustrating the critical intersection of domestic politics 
and foreign policy, Agung reports that his diplomatic offensive also 
required a special appeal to President Sukarno. In what appears to 
have been one of Agung's few personal meetings with the President,
Agung was gratified at Sukarno's consent to refrain from anti-Western 
oratory for the duration of the talks.
Together with the support registered at the April 1955 Bandung 
Conference it appears that Agung's diplomacy abroad and at home did, 
indeed, facilitate the October Dutch acceptance to convene talks. More 
decisive, however, was the Dutch urgency about negotiating a permanent 
basis for their economic privileges in Indonesia in the face of Indone­
sia’s demand for the revision of the onerous terms of the Round Table 
Conference. While secondary to the West Irian priority, Agung viewed 
progress on the economic issue as crucial to his hopes for a modicum of 
agreement on West Irian.
What is most significant about Agung's account of his talks at 
Geneva with Dutch Foreign Minister Luns is not the substance of the 
negotiations, but Agung's urgent attempt to place the blame for their 
failure on Luns and Sukarno.
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Agung's castigation of the Dutch is motivated by much more than a 
retrospective effort at historical self-justification. Precisely be­
cause he looked to the Dutch as Indonesia's natural patron and ally, 
Agung was infuriated by the shortsightedness and intransigence that led 
the Dutch to destroy this last best chance for a mutually beneficial 
relationship with Indonesia's political moderates.
Agung also places major blame on the radical nationalist opposi­
tion in Djakarta* led by Sukarno. Their public withdrawal of support 
for Agung spread into the cabinet itself and nearly forced the recall 
of Agung's delegation. While Harahap's political maneuvering could 
forestall that drastic step, the opposition's attacks also understand­
ably weakened the Dutch incentive to negotiate seriously. What was 
most galling to Agung, however, was Sukarno's public violation of his 
personal pledge to Agung to refrain from anti-Dutch political attacks 
for the duration of the talks.
Agung's charge of political opportunism leveled at Sukarno loses 
its force, however, when juxtaposed with the volte-face that Agung and 
the moderates underwent following the breakdown of the Geneva talks. 
Confronted with the reality of the portentous political defeat that 
they had feared, Agung and the cabinet sought to salvage a modicum of 
political advantage by adopting the militant posture of the opposition 
they had so vigorously denounced. In a last-minute bid for political 
credits before the scheduled demise of their caretaker cabinet. Harahap 
and Agung declared the unilateral abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian 
union. While justifiable anger and despair with Dutch and American 
intransigence certainly influenced this decision, Agung's own portrayal 
reveals the intrusion of domestic political motives. To compound this 
evidence of political opportunism dictating foreign policy positions, 
Sukarno and the PNI also reversed themselves by seeking to block par­
liamentary and Presidential approval of the cabinet's declaration. In 
this way the opposition hoped to ensure that the next cabinet under a 
PNI Prime Minister would reap the popularity inherent in gestures defy­
ing the Dutch. From the "administrators'" standpoint, there is an even 
deeper irony in this tale of petty opportunism. As Feith has warned, 
the adoption of militancy by Agung's moderates not only violated their 
professed allegiance to international law, but it gave Sukarno a tell­
ing precedent for the further unilateral actions of confrontation that 
Agung would find deeply abhorrent.
Even in this chapter on his own role as foreign minister, Agung 
neglects to deal with several pertinent issues already exposed in other 
accounts. In terms of the domestic political context of the Harahap 
cabinet, Agung completely avoids all mention of the role of the army. 
Instead he could have dealt with a critical, but largely unanswered 
question of the attempts of army leaders to influence the course of 
Agung's talks with the Dutch. Particularly during the January-February 
onslaught of opposition demands for supervision of the talks, one won­
ders whether any army leaders gave political backing to the beleaguered 
moderates, or did they follow the lead of the new Army Chief of Staff 
Nasution who reportedly had come to share Sukarno's view that West 
Irian could not be won through talks with the Dutch?
While of less political significance than illumination of the 
army's role, Agung might also have treated his own handling of the Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs. Precisely because of the "administrator's" 
reliance on diplomacy, especially with the West, one wonders what steps 
Agung took to improve the capabilities of the ministry. In that con­
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text, he could also have answered the allegations registered by Feith 
of far-reaching transfers of personnel for political reasons.
On a more theoretical plane, it is crucial to expose the limits 
of Agung's key assumptions about Indonesian political history. Three 
at least deserve brief mention. Most conspicuous is what might be 
called "the West Irian panacea thesis." At the core of this book, 
there is the widely shared view that if West Irian could have been 
settled, preferably no later than 1957 for Agung and somewhat later for 
other apostles of this notion, then the moderates would have triumphed 
over the extremists--i.e., the PSI and Masjumi or later the army would 
have checked the Sukarno-PKI advance to power. As Feith, Weinstein and 
others have contended, is it not more consistent with the character of 
Indonesi-a's political environment in the 1950s and, indeed, on to the 
present day to assume that in the absence of the West Irian issue "func 
tional equivalents" would have arisen as channels for the deep frustra­
tions of a society stirred by nationalist and economic aspirations yet 
trapped in the syndrome of underdevelopment?
Agung's inattention to this possibility is indicative of more fun­
damental assumptions about the class and cultural roots of Indonesian 
politics. His is in the end a very narrow Western elitist view of 
Indonesian politics. Not only is there little sense in his book of 
the class element in the policy of the "administrators," there is also 
no evidence of a personal capacity to empathize with the poverty of the 
peasant masses. They remain a dim abstraction introduced only as an 
addendum to stereotype anti-communist allusions to the PKI and its mass 
support.
If the class dimension is absent from Agung's analysis, so is the 
cultural perspective. Hazardous as a cultural roots approach is to any 
politics, to ignore it is to flaw understanding. In his preoccupation 
with charting the surface movements of international politics, indi­
vidual actors seldom appear more complex than their political positions 
Agung's research into Western sources clearly left him indifferent to 
the seminal work of men such as Geertz and Benda. More fundamentally 
he has forgotten the potent role of ethnicity as he must have experi­
enced it even at the level of elite politics.
To rebuke Agung for inattention to such theoretical perspectives 
is, however, unfair if we judge his book by the standard of personal 
memoir rather than scholarly history. That standard requires, above 
all, that the writer faithfully endeavor to reconstruct his participa­
tion in history "like it was." Library research may be necessary to 
stimulate recall of the sequence of events and their context, but it 
should not, in the first instance, provide the categories and questions 
of analysis. Uncontaminated recollection should be the unreachable 
objective. It is to Agung's credit that he has labored long to give 
both the scholar and the layman a substantial portion of his memoirs. 
May he extend them further into a full-fledged autobiography, such as 
Roeslan Abdulgani is currently attempting. And may Agung's effort be 
a spur to the Indonesian government to encourage and even subsidize 
other political figures to write their memoirs or at least give oral 
interviews. Perhaps most crucial here are the recollections of current 
political prisoners who, unlike Agung, may never enjoy either release 
from prison or the opportunity to write freely.
